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INTRODUCTION
President Trump caused quite a stir on Twitter on February 4th, 2017,
when he called Judge James Robart a “so-called judge” 1 for blocking his
recently issued executive order 2 that became known as the “travel ban.” The
travel ban suspended admission of all refugees from Syria for 120 days,
reduced the number of refugees admitted each year from 100,000 to 50,000,
and called for more careful vetting of immigrants from majority-Muslim
countries. 3 The President’s statements about Judge Robart drew strong
condemnation, even from within his own party. 4
1 Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976 [https://perma.cc/Y4MY-NEGC].
2 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
3 See Carol Morello, Trump Signs Order Temporarily Halting Admission of Refugees, Promises
Priority for Christians, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/trump-approves-extreme-vetting-of-refugees-promises-priority-for-christians/2017/01/27/
007021a2-e4c7-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_story.html [https://perma.cc/EBP9-VRSB].
4 For example, even Justice Neil Gorsuch, then still Trump’s nominee for the Supreme Court,
reportedly called Trump’s statements “disheartening.” See Ashley Killough, Supreme Court Nominee
Gorsuch Calls Trump’s Tweets ‘Disheartening,’ CNN (Feb. 9, 2017 12:14 PM),
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While the facts surrounding the travel ban and the President’s criticism
of the judiciary received substantial attention, considerably less attention was
given to what started the controversy—Judge Robart’s use of a “nationwide
injunction,” 5 which enjoined the federal government from enforcing the
executive order anywhere in the United States.6 Judges did not use this type
of remedy until the 1960s, 7 and some courts still describe it as an
“extraordinary remedy.” 8 Nevertheless, nationwide injunctions are now
widely used, 9 with some courts even issuing them as a matter of course for
certain types of cases. 10
The problem with this practice is that the unrestrained use of nationwide
injunctions comes with substantial drawbacks. While nationwide injunctions
may be more efficient, uniform, and egalitarian, they prevent the government
http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/08/politics/gorsuch-trump-tweets/index.html
[https://perma.cc/39TSM6MH].
5 Nationwide injunctions are also sometimes called “universal injunctions,” which may be a more
precise term because these broad remedies apply to all persons rather than to a geographic area. See
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (choosing to use the term
“universal injunction” as it is more precise). However, for clarity’s sake this Note opts for the more
commonly used term “nationwide injunction.”
6 Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), stay
denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
7 See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV.
417, 428–45 (2017) (discussing the origin of nationwide injunctions).
8 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017)
(“[I]ssuing a nationwide injunction should not be a default approach. It is an extraordinary remedy . . . .”).
9 See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated,
138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (upholding nationwide injunction against Executive Order 13,780); Earth Island
Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding nationwide injunction invalidating
Forest Service regulation); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1410 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (upholding nationwide injunction against Army Corps of Engineers’ rule); Washington v.
Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1103–04 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding nationwide injunction against the use of the
prison commissary fund by the Bureau of Prisons); Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1168–72 (9th Cir.
1987) (upholding nationwide injunction against an action by the Secretary of Labor); Wirtz v. Baldor
Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 533–35 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (issuing nationwide injunction against Secretary of
Labor’s determination under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act); City of Chicago v. Sessions,
2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (denying Attorney General’s request to stay nationwide injunction); Hawai’i v.
Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1239 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting nationwide injunction against travel ban),
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 564–65
(D. Md. 2017); Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (granting temporary restraining order and
temporary nationwide injunction until court could hear issue), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
10 For instance, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes review of “final agency action”
and is frequently involved in challenges to agency actions. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst., 490 F.3d at 699
(holding the language “set aside” in the APA compels nationwide injunctions); see also 5 U.S.C. § 704
(2012) (authorizing judicial review of “final agency action[s]” (emphasis omitted)). See generally JARED
P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44699, AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL
AGENCY ACTION 1–2, 9 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44699.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJF4-AKYP]
(“The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is perhaps the most prominent modern vehicle for challenging
the actions of a federal agency.”).
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from enforcing the policy in question anywhere in the country. This prevents
other district courts from reviewing the issue, freezes the law in place, and
inhibits circuit splits from developing. 11 Nationwide injunctions also run
counter to the principle of comity between federal courts and circumvent the
rule that the federal government is free to litigate issues that it lost in other
cases. 12 Moreover, nationwide injunctions promote forum shopping and may
even make class actions a waste of time because they provide for class-wide
relief without the trouble and expense of class certification. 13
While judges have issued nationwide injunctions for decades, 14
scholars 15 and courts 16 have recently begun to give them more careful
attention. Some courts realize that issuing a nationwide injunction requires
justification, 17 but the scope of an injunction is often dealt with briefly or not
at all. 18 This is understandable, because the Supreme Court has offered only
clues as to the proper scope of an injunction and has never spoken directly
on this issue. 19 To solve this dilemma, some scholars have argued that
nationwide injunctions should never be available, 20 while many courts
employ logic that would almost always make nationwide injunctions
available. 21 Others offer solutions somewhere in between. 22 Who is right, and
how can this problem be resolved?
This Note takes a middle path by offering a more complete view of the
scope of a court’s equitable powers, taking into account both the harms and
11

See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 69–78 and accompanying text.
13 See generally Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented
Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
487 (2016) (arguing that nationwide injunctions reduce the incentive for class actions).
14 See Bray, supra note 7, at 428.
15 See infra Part II.
16 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017)
(discussing increased attention to nationwide injunctions).
17 See id.
18 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3,
2017) (issuing a nationwide temporary restraining order discussing the propriety of a nationwide
injunction in two sentences), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
19 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 500–01 (2009) (“We likewise do not reach
the question whether, if respondents prevailed, a nationwide injunction would be appropriate.”). Justice
Clarence Thomas also discussed nationwide injunctions in a concurrence. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
Ct. 2392, 2424–29 (2018); see also Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089–90
(2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (objecting to the use of a nationwide
injunction on the basis that the equities favored the government but taking no position on the propriety of
nationwide injunctions in general).
20 See Bray, supra note 7, at 471.
21 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d
687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007).
22 See infra Sections II.A and II.C.
12
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benefits of nationwide injunctions. Instead of eliminating the nationwide
injunction 23 or imposing a geographical limit, 24 this Note advocates for a
balancing test, which is rooted in the well-recognized practice of balancing
the equities. 25 A balancing test rooted in this doctrine therefore promises to
rein in the use of this extraordinary 26 remedy without sacrificing the
discretion that judges have always had in fashioning equitable relief.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I compares the benefits and harms
of nationwide injunctions and provides an overview of some of the most
notable cases discussing the propriety of such injunctions. Part II then
surveys the scholarship on this subject and argues that these proposed
solutions are unsatisfactory or insufficient. Part III proposes a new
framework for analyzing the many factors that courts and scholars have
identified as relevant by boiling them down to three meta-factors or
categories: (1) “Who,” the parties before the court; (2) “What,” the nature of
the claim being litigated; and (3) “Where,” the effects the remedy will have
on the judicial system where the claim is being litigated. Part IV argues that
a balancing test using these meta-factors is the proper way to determine when
nationwide injunctions should be used, even in difficult cases where the
abuse of discretion standard cannot be met, and provides two examples of
how this test should be applied. This Part also argues that even in difficult
cases where the abuse of discretion standard cannot be met, a balancing test
still usefully contributes to the common law method of judicial rulemaking
by requiring judges to explain their reasoning. Finally, Part V considers and
rejects the possible counterarguments that multifactor balancing tests are
unworkable and violate the separation of powers; it ultimately concludes that
this three-factor test is workable in practice and that balancing tests do not
pose the same separation of powers concerns in the remedies context.
I.

BENEFITS AND HARMS OF NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS

Part of what makes the debate over nationwide injunctions so complex
is that there are powerful values on both sides of the debate, any of which
could determine the outcome in a given case. This Part examines both the
benefits and harms of nationwide injunctions, and in doing so concludes that,

23

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.C.
25 See, e.g., Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“[C]ourts ‘must balance the competing claims
of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested
relief.’” (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987))).
26 See id. at 22 (discussing how preliminary injunctions are “an extraordinary remedy that may only
be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief” (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam))).
24
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despite their potential harm, nationwide injunctions may still be useful in
certain situations.
A. Benefits
Judges and scholars have identified three primary benefits of
nationwide injunctions: (1) the rule of law and uniformity, (2) egalitarian
concerns, and (3) judicial economy or efficiency.
First, the simple moral intuition that it is wrong to allow illegal—and
even more importantly, unconstitutional—conduct to continue unchecked is
perhaps the most compelling explanation for the proliferation of nationwide
injunctions. While the widespread use of nationwide injunctions is a
relatively new phenomenon, 27 it follows logically from the concept of
judicial review established in Marbury v. Madison, 28 in which the Supreme
Court firmly established that the courts have the power to strike down
unconstitutional laws. 29 It is only a small step from the concept of judicial
review to the nationwide injunction—if it is the job of the courts to declare
what the law is, any view that contradicts a judicial opinion is, in a sense, not
the law. This is particularly true in constitutional matters because the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land, 30 rendering all statutes that
conflict with it moot. 31 To allow an agency to continue enforcing a “moot”
law arguably violates this basic principle. 32
The rule of law argument in favor of nationwide injunctions also
justifies their increasingly widespread use. Because the federal government
generally enacts policies and statutes uniformly around the country, if one of
those policies or statutes is unconstitutional, the resulting harm is usually
27 Professor Samuel Bray identifies the 1960s as the beginning of the nationwide injunction. See
Bray, supra note 7, at 437–44.
28 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”).
29 Scholars have noted that others endorsed judicial review even before Marbury. See Randy E.
Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Judicial Power, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 115, 121–32 (2004)
(arguing that Marbury did not invent judicial review and that various Founders endorsed the concept as
an element of the judicial power in Article III).
30 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be
the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
31 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (“It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in
declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the
laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution,
have that rank.” (emphasis omitted)).
32 Indeed, in City of Chicago v. Sessions, Judge Harry Leinenweber employed exactly this reasoning
to justify the use of a nationwide injunction, notwithstanding growing concerns about their propriety. See
No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017) (“The rule of law is undermined where
a court holds that the Attorney General is likely engaging in legally unauthorized conduct, but
nevertheless allows that conduct in other jurisdictions across the country.”).
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nationwide as well. If the rule of law disallows enforcement against any
similarly situated citizen, nationwide injunctions must become the norm. 33
Second, by protecting affected individuals not party to the litigation,
nationwide injunctions can also promote equality. In fact, in Wirtz v. Baldor
Electric Company, which appears to be the first case in which a court issued
a nationwide injunction, the court justified the use of the injunction because
it promoted equality before the law. 34 These concerns about equality are
exacerbated when similarly situated plaintiffs have different access to legal
resources. 35 Because equal treatment before the law is fundamental to a sense
of justice and fairness, it may be important to protect nonparties in some
instances by using nationwide injunctions.
Lastly, nationwide injunctions can help preserve judicial resources.
While a slower, more incremental approach may allow for the “percolation”
of the best ideas on a particular subject, 36 nationwide injunctions effectively
decide the issue immediately for the entire nation, thus preventing
duplicative litigation, which reduces courts’ dockets. 37 Given widespread
concern about the often exorbitant costs of litigation and the costs to society
of funding the judicial system, 38 it may be most beneficial to have some legal
issues decided once and for all.
B. Harms
While nationwide injunctions do afford these benefits, they can also
cause at least six distinct harms: (1) increased forum shopping, (2)
33

See Sam Bray, Finally, a Court Defends the National Injunction, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Oct.
14,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/10/14/finally-a-court-defends-the-national-injunction
[https://perma.cc/AR856XZP] (“Once that proposition is accepted, the national injunction will have become the norm for all
challenges to the validity of a federal statute, regulation, or order.”).
34 337 F.2d 518, 534−35 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (“[Where] a lower court . . . has spoken, that court would
ordinarily give the same relief to any individual who comes to it with an essentially similar cause of
action . . . .”). The court in City of Chicago v. Sessions likewise endorsed this reasoning in deciding to
issue a nationwide injunction. See 2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (“All similarly-situated persons are entitled
to similar outcomes under the law, and . . . an injunction that results in unequal treatment of litigants
appears arbitrary.”).
35 See Kate Huddleston, Nationwide Injunctions: Venue Considerations, 127 YALE L.J.F. 242, 244
(2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/nationwide-injunctions-venue-considerations
[https://perma.cc/DME7-JVFN] (arguing that eliminating nationwide injunctions “might lead to . . .
differential access to favorable judgments based on litigant resources”).
36 See infra Section I.B.
37 See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(granting nationwide injunction on the basis that a narrower injunction would lead to a “flood of
duplicative litigation” and could overburden the D.C. Circuit).
38 See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 855 (2015) (“Because of
fears that litigation is too costly, reduction of litigation expenses has been the touchstone of procedural
reform for the past thirty years.”).
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asymmetric issue preclusion, (3) increased chance and incidences of
conflicting injunctions, (4) damage to the Supreme Court’s supervisory
position, (5) a lack of remedial uniformity, and (6) conflict with precedent.
First, because a nationwide injunction will be equally powerful no
matter which court decides the case, broad injunctions encourage plaintiffs
to seek out ideologically friendly judges. 39 Forum shopping paired with a
nationwide injunction can act as a type of veto in the hands of plaintiffs,
creating a systematic disadvantage for the government. Furthermore, forum
shopping may run the risk of painting the judiciary as just another tool for
savvy political actors, endangering public perception of the judicial process
as a whole. 40
This concern also crosses political boundaries. Most recently, members
of the Trump Administration objected 41 when judges issued nationwide
39 See Bray, supra note 7, at 459–60 (noting that high profile litigation against the Bush and Trump
Administrations tended to be brought in the Ninth Circuit, while litigation against the Obama
Administration was frequently brought in federal courts in Texas). For example, plaintiffs brought no
fewer than six challenges to the Obama Administration’s policies in Texas, including challenges to the
“Dear Colleague” letter from the Department of Education and an antidiscrimination provision of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA). See Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 695 (N.D. Tex.
2016) (issuing nationwide injunction against antidiscrimination provision of the ACA); Nevada v. U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 531, 533–34 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (issuing nationwide injunction against
Department of Labor regulation that would have made an estimated 4.2 million workers eligible for
overtime pay); Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-425, 2016 WL
8188655, at *15 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016) (issuing injunction against Department of Labor guidance and
presidential Executive Order, which required federal contractors to report labor violations); Texas v.
United States, No. 7:16-cv-00054-O, 2016 WL 7852331, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2016) (issuing
nationwide injunction against Department of Labor’s “Dear Colleague Letter”); Nat’1 Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066-C, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016) (issuing
nationwide injunction against the Department of Labor’s “persuader rule”); Texas v. United States, 86 F.
Supp. 3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (lawsuit opposing the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided
Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.).
40 See, e.g., Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, HARV. L. REV.
BLOG (Jan. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-to-the-nationwide-injunctionproblem [https://perma.cc/RWE8-CNJD] (“Most troubling, the forum shopping this remedy incentivizes
on issues of substantial public importance feeds the growing perception that the courts are politicized.”).
41 See Kyle Balluck & Rebecca Savransky, Trump Slams District Court over Travel Ban, Sanctuary
Cities Rulings, THE HILL (Apr. 26, 2017, 6:59 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/330589trump-slams-district-court-over-travel-ban-sanctuary-cities-rulings
[https://perma.cc/ZLT5-XVSH]
(discussing Trump’s criticism of the Ninth Circuit); see also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Apr. 26, 2017, 3:38 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/857182179469774848
[https://perma.cc/6ZL6-TT29] (stating that it was no coincidence travel ban and sanctuary cities cases
were brought in “the Ninth Circuit . . . . They used to call this ‘judge shopping!’”). Attorney General Jeff
Sessions has also criticized judges issuing nationwide injunctions as “super-legislators.” See Melissa
Quinn, Jeff Sessions Slams Federal Judges for Issuing Nationwide Injunctions Hindering Trump’s
Agenda, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 10, 2018, 10:47 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/jeffsessions-slams-federal-judges-for-issuing-nationwide-injunctions-hindering-trumps-agenda
[https://perma.cc/Z2T6-66H3] (quoting Attorney General Sessions, “Today, in effect, single district court
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injunctions against the Administration’s “Muslim ban.” 42 Democrats have
also had reasons to be concerned with forum shopping. 43 Consider possibly
the most obvious case of forum shopping, Texas v. United States, 44 in which
Texas and twenty-five other states sued the Obama Administration over its
immigration program titled Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). 45 Plaintiffs brought this case in the
Southern District of Texas in the Brownsville division, a district with “only
two active federal district judges.” 46 One of those judges was Judge Andrew
Hanen, a known conservative who had publicly criticized the Obama
Administration’s immigration policies. 47 Judge Hanen heard the case and
ultimately issued a nationwide injunction.48
Second, nationwide injunctions cause asymmetric issue preclusion. If a
court rules in favor of the federal government and denies a nationwide
injunction, only the parties to that suit are precluded from bringing another
suit on the same subject. 49 If, however, a court rules against the government
and issues an injunction, the government is enjoined from enforcing that

judges are going beyond proper adjudicative bounds and making themselves super-legislators for the
entire United States”).
42 See Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1237, 1239 (D. Haw. 2017) (issuing an injunction
against other parts of the travel ban); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539,
565–66 (D. Md. 2017) (issuing an injunction against the revised version of the travel ban); Washington
v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (issuing an injunction
against the United States from enforcing President Trump’s Executive Order), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151
(9th Cir. 2017).
43 See, e.g., Costa, supra note 40 (Judge Costa, a Democrat and Obama appointee to the Fifth Circuit,
criticizing nationwide injunctions on multiple grounds, including their tendency to politicize the courts
and incentivize forum shopping).
44 86 F. Supp. 3d at 604.
45 DAPA granted deferred action status to millions of undocumented immigrants, provided that they
were parents of children who were either American citizens or lawful permanent residents, allowing them
to remain in the United States. Id.
46 See Andrew Kent, Nationwide Injunctions and the Lower Federal Courts, LAWFARE (Feb. 3, 2017,
3:02
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/nationwide-injunctions-and-lower-federal-courts
[https://perma.cc/F8JN-CC33].
47 See id. (“Other rules and institutional features can sometimes make shopping for a particular judge
possible. The DAPA litigation, for example, was filed by Texas in the Brownsville division of the
Southern District of Texas, where there are only two active federal district judges, including one, Andrew
Hanen, who was known to be very conservative and had previously publicly criticized Obama
administration immigration policies. Hanen ended up getting the case . . . .”); see also Bray, supra note
7, at 458–59 (noting that district courts in Texas stymied many of Obama’s policies).
48 See Kent, supra note 46.
49 A judgment can only be enforced against a named party because it is a violation of due process to
enforce a judgment against a party who has not had an opportunity to be heard. See Postal Tel. Cable Co.
v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918).
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statute anywhere. 50 This asymmetric issue preclusion could thus unfairly
disadvantage the government, as illustrated by the litigation surrounding
Trump’s travel ban. While an early challenge to the travel ban in the District
of Massachusetts was unsuccessful, 51 other district courts subsequently
found that the Executive Order was unconstitutional and enjoined it
nationwide, essentially rendering the government’s victory in Massachusetts
meaningless. 52 This result asymmetrically benefitted plaintiffs because the
government could not enforce the Executive Order anywhere in the country,
despite both losing and winning in the lower courts. Thus, even where
defendants have won as many or even more cases than have their plaintiff
counterparts, they can still in effect “lose” in the vast majority of circuits. 53
Third, nationwide injunctions increase friction between courts, which
could result in significant consequences for the court system as a whole.
Take, for instance, the Supreme Court’s equally divided affirmation of the
Fifth Circuit’s nationwide injunction against DAPA in United States v.
Texas, 54 which left the Fifth Circuit’s decision intact. Many plaintiffs
attempted to circumvent the Texas district court’s injunction by challenging
its scope, and one district judge in New York even signaled his willingness
to disregard the injunction entirely. 55 Though there are now nine Justices on
the Court, this case illustrated a possible worst-case scenario, in which two

50 Several scholars have noted this asymmetry. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 7, at 460 (“The opportunity
for forum shopping is extended by the asymmetric effect of decisions upholding and invalidating a statute,
regulation, or order.”); Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common
Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2020–21 (2015) (“Quasi-individual actions
give rise to troubling asymmetries. . . . This . . . potentially expos[es] [defendants] to serial relitigation.”);
Morley, supra note 13, at 494 (“Defendant-Oriented Injunctions also raise fairness concerns due to
asymmetric claim preclusion.”).
51 See Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 38 (D. Mass. 2017) (denying injunctive relief on
the basis that plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of success on the merits).
52 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3,
2017) (enjoining Trump’s injunction nationwide), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
53 This asymmetry can also exacerbate the potential for forum shopping, because even if the initial
plaintiff does not forum shop and the statute is upheld, future plaintiffs need only find one ideologically
aligned judge to defeat the statute in every other jurisdiction. In Professor Bray’s words, “Shop ’til the
statute drops.” See Bray, supra note 7, at 460.
54 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (mem.). At the time, there were only eight
Justices on the Court because Justice Antonin Scalia’s seat had not yet been filled. See Adam Liptak &
Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama Immigration Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/supreme-court-immigration-obama-dapa.html
[https://perma.cc/KTG3-7L4C]; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
55 See Alan Feuer, Brooklyn Lawsuit Could Affect the Fate of Millions of Immigrants Nationwide,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/nyregion/brooklyn-lawsuit-couldaffect-the-fate-of-millions-of-immigrants-nationwide.html [https://perma.cc/FW7J-8EFT]. During the
hearing, Judge Nicholas Garaufis stated, “I have absolutely no intention of simply marching behind in
the parade that’s going on out there in Texas, if this person has rights here.” Id.

340

113:331 (2018)

Who, What, and Where

or more circuits issue conflicting decisions and the Supreme Court
subsequently deadlocks on the constitutionality of the statute.56 This could
leave a plaintiff in a bind, mandated by one judge to follow a statute but
prohibited by another from doing the same. 57 While conflict on this scale has
not occurred recently, 58 it is likely that more conflicts will occur as
nationwide injunctions become more common.
Fourth, nationwide injunctions undercut one widely hailed 59 benefit of
the circuit court system—what Judge Harold Leventhal famously called a
“value in percolation among the circuits.” 60 Under this account, the ability of
multiple circuits to review novel issues of law and fashion different solutions
provides distinct advantages. Percolation helps filter out the truly difficult
cases that would benefit most from Supreme Court review and allows for
more judges to lend their voices to the discussion, increasing the diversity of
viewpoints presented and ensuring that both sides of an argument are
presented in their most compelling form. 61
Nationwide injunctions undercut this feature of our system by
preventing the judicial system from effectively screening out meritorious
issues for the Supreme Court’s review. A nationwide injunction may
increase or decrease the chance of certiorari being granted, but in either case,
harm may occur. On the one hand, for most cases involving nationwide
injunctions, the chances of certiorari being granted are likely decreased

56

See Bray, supra note 7, at 462–64.
Conflicts caused by inconsistent court orders are typically resolved when one court backs down,
the circuit court reverses the decision, or one court decides to exclude from the injunction those circuits
that have upheld the enjoined policy. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 710 F.
Supp. 2d 916, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (narrowing the scope of an injunction against the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to avoid conflict with the District of Wyoming’s injunction but
lamenting “the unfortunate appearance of a lack of judicial comity that has arisen in the wake of the
Wyoming court’s decision and the awkward position in which the [USDA] finds itself”). However,
conflicting injunctions are much more likely if judges issue broad injunctions.
58 Professor Bray points to the Erie Railroad legal battles in the nineteenth century, which involved
conflicting injunctions between state judges, as an illustration of how dangerous these conflicts can be.
See Bray, supra note 7, at 462.
59 See, e.g., Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm,
131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 52 (2017) (“Or take percolation. There is a widely held belief that it is useful,
which we share.”).
60 Harold Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U. L. REV.
881, 907 (1975).
61 In Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s words, “[W]hen frontier legal problems are presented, periods
of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts may yield a better
informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1
(1995).
57
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because no circuit split is able to develop, keeping the law from developing.62
On the other hand, if the case is very high-profile, as was DAPA litigation,
a nationwide injunction may have the opposite effect, prompting the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari as soon as possible to resolve the resulting
crisis. 63 In both cases, the “percolating” process fails, either by preventing
potential circuit splits from developing and revealing important divisions, or
by obliging the Court to take cases without having the benefit of insight from
the lower courts’ thorough review.
Fifth, the use of nationwide injunctions results in a lack of remedial
uniformity among the courts. One of the most frequently articulated
advantages of nationwide injunctions is that they promote uniformity; 64
however, this is often not the case. Contrast, for example, two quotes from
the same circuit. In 2011, Judge Posner noted that “[w]hen the court believes
the underlying right to be highly significant, it may write injunctive relief as
broad as the right itself.” 65 However, another Seventh Circuit decision—that
Judge Posner himself signed onto—stated the exact opposite position: “A
wrong done to [a] plaintiff in the past does not authorize prospective, classwide relief unless a class has been certified. Why else bother with class
actions?” 66 This confusion is not limited to the relationship between class
actions and broad injunctive relief—courts are split on whether the
Administrative Procedure Act calls for nationwide injunctions, 67 and
whether facial challenges are more deserving of nationwide injunctions. 68
Judges therefore have virtually complete discretion whether to issue an
injunction and can cite authority supporting any decision about the scope of
equitable relief.

62 See Getzel Berger, Note, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A Structural
Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1087 n.99 (2017) (“[M]ost nationwide injunctions receive far less
attention, and, therefore, likely have a lower chance of receiving certiorari absent a circuit split.”).
63 See Bray, supra note 7, at 422 (noting that the nationwide injunction might even force the Supreme
Court to review a “major constitutional question on a motion for a stay. In that procedural posture, the
Court would be reviewing lower court decisions reached in haste, and without the benefit of a record”).
64 See supra Section I.A.
65 Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 1 DAN
B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4(6), at 113 (2d ed. 1993)).
66 McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1997).
67 Compare Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding the language
“set aside” in the APA compelled a nationwide injunction), with Va. Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC,
263 F.3d 379, 394 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that “[n]othing in the language of the APA” compels
nationwide injunctions).
68 Compare, e.g., Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (“A
nationwide injunction is appropriate when a party brings a facial challenge to agency action.”), with L.A.
Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 665 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining to issue a nationwide
injunction in spite of a successful facial challenge to a regulation).
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Finally, nationwide injunctions conflict with other doctrine, namely the
federal government’s exemption from nonmutual issue preclusion and
intercircuit agency nonacquiescence. Under modern principles of issue
preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel) a party cannot relitigate issues
that it previously litigated and lost, 69 even if the party asserting collateral
estoppel was not a party to the original litigation. 70 However, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Mendoza made an exception to this rule for the
federal government, so that the federal government is free to relitigate issues
that it previously lost against other parties. 71 The Court noted that to do
otherwise would “substantially thwart the development of important
questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular
legal issue.” 72
Nationwide injunctions attempt to bypass Mendoza by effectively
preventing the federal government from relitigating issues in other courts,
thus subjecting the federal government to a form of de facto claim
preclusion. This poses the same harms to the judicial system that the Court
noted in Mendoza: thwarting percolation among the circuits and putting
pressure on the Supreme Court’s certiorari process. 73 Even though Mendoza
signaled the importance of the federal government’s discretion in relitigating
previously decided issues, 74 nationwide injunctions threaten to render
Mendoza meaningless.
Intercircuit agency nonacquiescence is a second doctrinal inconsistency
with the use of nationwide injunctions. Under the doctrine of intercircuit
nonacquiescence, an agency may decide to not be bound by a court’s

69

See, e.g., Brockman v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., 342 F.3d 1159, 1165−66 (10th Cir. 2003)
(“The collateral estoppel doctrine prevents relitigation of issues which were involved actually and
necessarily in a prior action between the same parties.” (quoting Kahrs v. Bd. of Trs. for Platte Cty. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1995))).
70 See Linda J. Soldo, Note, Parklane Hosiery: Offensive Use of Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel in
Federal Courts, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 509, 509–10 (1980) (describing the abandonment of the requirement
of mutuality and the difference between offensive and defensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel);
see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (endorsing offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333–34 (1971) (endorsing
defensive nonmutual issue preclusion).
71 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984).
72 Id. at 160.
73 Getzel Berger insightfully recognized that both the benefits and harms of nonmutual issue
preclusion against the federal government mirror those of nationwide injunctions. See Berger, supra note
62, at 1096 (“The systemic policy considerations weighed in Mendoza mirror the key policy
considerations on nationwide injunctions. The Court’s analysis framed the issue as pitting uniformity and
efficiency against percolation and intercircuit dialogue.”).
74 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
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decision in other jurisdictions. 75 While the Supreme Court has never
specifically endorsed any form of agency nonacquiescence, intercircuit
nonacquiescence has been widely accepted, 76 as it flows logically from
Mendoza and the rule against intercircuit stare decisis: If courts of appeals’
decisions are only precedential within their respective circuits, and if the
federal government should be free to relitigate issues in multiple circuits,
then federal agencies should not be bound by a judicial decision nationwide
until the Supreme Court resolves the issue. 77 However, just as nationwide
injunctions attempt to circumvent Mendoza, they also effectively nullify
agency nonacquiescence. 78 By enjoining agencies from enforcing policies
anywhere in the country, nationwide injunctions essentially require agencies
to acquiesce to the injunction-issuing district court in every jurisdiction.
In sum, the debate over nationwide injunctions is complex, with a
variety of arguments available to both sides. Therefore, any proposed
solution must be sure to take into account both the benefits and disadvantages
of nationwide injunctions.
II. CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP ON NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS
In recent years, a growing number of scholars have attempted to make
sense of the benefits and harms of nationwide injunctions in different ways:
Professor Samuel Bray argues that nationwide injunctions should never be
available; Zayn Siddique defends the “complete relief” principle currently
used by courts in a student note; Getzel Berger argues that injunctions should
only reach the borders of a circuit; and Daniel Walker identifies nine factors
courts should consider. This Note analyzes each of these positions in turn.

75 There are two forms of agency nonacquiescence: intercircuit and intracircuit nonacquiescence. See
Kevin Haskins, Note, A Delicate Balance: How Agency Nonacquiescence and the EPA’s Water Transfer
Rule Dilute the Clean Water Act After Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of
New York, 60 ME. L. REV. 173, 175 (2008). Intracircuit nonacquiescence occurs when an agency decides
to not be bound by a decision in the same jurisdiction that issued that decision. See Samuel Estreicher &
Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 743 (1989).
In contrast, intercircuit nonacquiescence occurs when an agency decides to not be bound in a different
jurisdiction. See id. There is debate over whether intracircuit nonacquiescence is constitutional. See id.
(arguing that intracircuit nonacquiescence should only be allowed in limited circumstances).
76 See, e.g., Indep. Petrol. Ass’n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(“[I]ntercircuit nonacquiescence is permissible, especially when the law is unsettled.”); see also Berger,
supra note 62, at 1099 n.160 (compiling sources recognizing intercircuit nonacquiescence).
77 For a summary of the arguments for and against different forms of agency nonacquiescence, see
Haskins, supra note 75, at 176–83.
78 See Berger, supra note 62, at 1099 (“Nationwide injunctions flatly prohibit intercircuit
nonacquiescence.”).
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A. Professor Bray’s Plaintiff-Limited Injunction Rule
In his widely cited article, Professor Samuel Bray argues that, because
the role of the courts is solely to do justice to the parties before the court,
courts do not have the power to issue nationwide injunctions.79 In doing so,
Professor Bray lays out three main arguments. First, there can be no support
in equity for nationwide injunctions because there were no injunctions
against the Crown in traditional courts of equity, as the chancellor spoke on
behalf of the king. 80 Second, because Article III of the U.S. Constitution
gives the courts “judicial Power” that is limited to the power to do justice
between the parties before the court, any equitable remedy that reaches
beyond the named plaintiffs violates Article III. 81 Lastly, limits on traditional
equity were historically not necessary because there was only one chancellor
in England, compared to what Professor Bray characterizes as the “multiple
chancellors” system in the United States. 82
While Professor Bray’s plaintiff-limited injunction rule is clear and
easy to apply, it is inadequate for multiple reasons. Though traditional
principles of equity did not often allow for courts to reach nonparties, 83
equity constantly evolved to meet new issues of the day that the formalistic
and static common law could not meet. 84 The Supreme Court has made it
clear that courts of equity today possess the same equitable powers that
courts of equity exercised in England at this country’s founding, and
therefore this discretion carries over.85 To make carefully formalistic
79 See Bray, supra note 7, at 418 (“A federal court should give what might be called a ‘plaintiffprotective injunction,’ enjoining the defendant’s conduct only with respect to the plaintiff. No matter how
important the question and no matter how important the value of uniformity, a federal court should not
award a national injunction.”).
80 See id. at 425 (“In English equity before the Founding of the United States, there were no
injunctions against the Crown. No doubt part of the explanation was the identification of the Chancellor
with the King . . . .”).
81 See id. at 421 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
82 See id. at 420.
83 Professor Bray himself acknowledges that this was not universally true, because the mechanism
of a “bill of peace” allowed the chancellor to resolve multiple claims of a cohesive group all at once, a
type of “proto-class action.” See id. at 426.
84 See, e.g., The Earl of Oxford’s Case in Chancery (1615) 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486, 1 Chan. Rep. 1,
6–7 (“The Office of the Chancellor is . . . to soften and mollify the Extremity of the Law . . . .”). The idea
that equity existed to soften the harsh consequences of the law dates all the way back to Aristotle.
Paraphrasing Aristotle, Blackstone once wrote: “For, since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen or
expressed, it is necessary that, when the general decrees of the law come to be applied to particular cases,
there should be somewhere a power vested of defining those circumstances . . . .” 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61.
85 See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) (“The suits in equity of which the federal courts
have had ‘cognizance’ ever since 1789 constituted the body of law which had been transplanted to this
country from the English Court of Chancery.”).
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arguments about the extent of a court’s equitable powers misunderstands the
way that equity actually operated.86
Even if Professor Bray were correct about the proper extent of the
judiciary’s equitable powers, his proposition is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s view of the propriety of injunctions reaching beyond class
members. In Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, the
Supreme Court affirmed the practice of issuing injunctions that reach beyond
named plaintiffs. 87 While the Court narrowed the injunction against the travel
ban to cover only those with a “credible claim of a bona fide relationship
with a person or entity in the United States,” the Court still found that, after
balancing the equities, some individuals who were not named plaintiffs
should be subject to the injunction. 88 In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Thomas made an argument similar to that of Professor Bray, but his dissent
garnered only three votes. 89 Therefore, until Professor Bray’s view gains
favor among more Justices, those who wish to reduce the number and
breadth of nationwide injunctions (as Professor Bray does) will have to argue
within the equitable balancing framework the Court currently endorses.
Professor Bray also freely acknowledges one of the most striking
negative consequences of his proposal: plaintiff detection. 90 The example he
provides is a good one: fourteen plaintiffs challengedand won an
injunction againsta California Highway Patrol policy of aggressive
enforcement of a helmet law, which the court found violated the Fourth
Amendment. 91 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction against anyone, not

86 Along these lines, in his article, Professor Bray alludes to a possible counterargument. While
England had only one chancellor, the Constitution shifted to a multiple-chancellor model of the federal
courts, thus decreasing the equitable powers of the courts. See Bray, supra note 7, at 472–73. However,
Professor Bray does not cite any sources contemporary with the ratification of the Constitution that
support this view. It would be surprising indeed for the authors of the Constitution to change the powers
of courts of equity without saying so in the Constitution itself. Moreover, Article III only requires the
existence of one chancellor: the Supreme Court. The circuit court system was created by statute, not by
the Constitution, and therefore does not affect the federal courts’ equitable powers.
87 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087–88 (2017). The Court affirmatively cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision to
issue a broad injunction and cited a previous Supreme Court case which allowed Americans to challenge
the exclusion of a speaker on First Amendment grounds, even though the speaker was not a plaintiff to
the case. See id. (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763–65 (1972)).
88 See id. at 2088.
89 See id. at 2089–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In a more recent case, Justice Thomas wrote separately
to voice his concerns about nationwide injunctions, but no other Justice joined him. See Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am skeptical that district courts have the
authority to enter universal injunctions. These injunctions . . . appear to be inconsistent with longstanding
limits on equitable relief and the power of Article III courts.”).
90 See Bray, supra note 7, at 478–81.
91 Id. at 478; see also Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1502 (9th Cir.
1996).
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just the named plaintiffs, reasoning that it would be incredibly impractical
for officers to determine whether a given motorcyclist was one of the
fourteen named plaintiffs who had won the injunction against the State.92
Professor Bray responds to this problem by stating that this does not actually
matter, because the burden is on the State to find a way to comply with the
injunction and the State could embrace a more “creative option, such as
distributing decals to the [plaintiffs]” to assist officers with identification.93
However, this “creative” option borders on the absurd, and judges are
generally reluctant to sanction law enforcement agencies. 94 The simpler,
more efficient solution therefore is to enter the injunction vis-à-vis everyone.
Beyond plaintiff-detection issues, there are cases in which the rights of
named plaintiffs are bound up with the rights of similarly situated nonparties.
Take, for example, civil rights cases such as school desegregation. It is
perhaps unsurprising that injunctions against governmental entities changed
while these cases were being decided,95 because entire groups of AfricanAmerican citizens felt the harm from segregation and discrimination. As a
result, the Supreme Court affirmed complex and far-reaching remedies,
including desegregating entire school districts and setting up busing—a
complex remedial scheme that reached beyond named plaintiffs. 96
“Complete relief” could not really be had for a plaintiff if they were the only
person of their race admitted into a school, as their interest in equal
protection was bound up with the rights of others.
In conclusion, due to its inconsistency with the history of equity, its
rejection by the Supreme Court, its potential for absurd results, and the
possibility that wide swaths of the population will be left vulnerable, the
plaintiff-only rule cannot be the answer.

92 Easyriders, 92 F.3d at 1502 (“[Because] it is unlikely that law enforcement officials . . . would
inquire before citation into whether a motorcyclist was among the named plaintiffs or a member of
Easyriders, the plaintiffs would not receive the complete relief to which they are entitled without
statewide application of the injunction.”).
93 See Bray, supra note 7, at 479.
94 See Daniel J. Walker, Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of Non-Class
Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1119, 1148 (2005) (“The courts tend to show a high degree of
deference to law enforcement agencies, and this deference seems to influence the courts’ decisions to
narrow the scope of injunctions . . . .”).
95 See Bray, supra note 7, at 454 (“Yet another change that might have influenced the development
of the national injunction was the desegregation cases of the 1950s and 1960s.”).
96 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (“The judgments below . . . are accordingly
reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders
and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a
racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.”); see also Walker,
supra note 94, at 1132 (“The extraordinary nature of [school desegregation] required the courts[] to
stretch their injunctive powers well beyond their historical limits.”).
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B. Siddique’s “Complete Relief” Principle
In his note, Zayn Siddique proposes the use of the “complete relief”
principle, which states that the scope of an injunction should be “no more
burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs.” 97 This test more or less restates the current approach98 and has
already been adopted by the Supreme Court. 99 The advantages to this
approach are that it already has widespread support in the courts 100 and
weighs the interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
Despite having already been adopted by the Court, this principle is
insufficient for two reasons. First, despite its widespread acceptance by
courts, it has thus far been ineffective in successfully constraining judges’
use of nationwide injunctions. As even many supporters of nationwide
injunctions agree, nationwide injunctions are “strong medicine” and should
be used less often than they are now. 101 Therefore, something more than this
rule is necessary to constrain their use.

97 Zayn Siddique, Note, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2103 (2017) (quoting
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)).
98 See Bray, supra note 7, at 466 (“The [approach] most commonly raised by courts and
commentators is the principle of ‘complete relief’ . . . .”); see also Siddique, supra note 97, at 2105 n.54
(explaining that the complete relief principle “is a reiteration of an equally well-established principle that
‘the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy’” (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971))).
99 See, e.g., Califano, 442 U.S. at 702 (“[I]njunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the
defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); see also Madsen v. Women’s
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (same) (quoting Califano, 442 U.S. at 702). While the Court
in Califano attributed this test to the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
federal courts quickly adopted the test, and the Supreme Court later clarified that it was the law. See
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2090 (2017). Based on a Westlaw search,
Califano appears to be the origin of this particular wording of the test.
100 APA challenges to agency regulations are an exception where this principle is not consistently
applied. Siddique and others have identified a split in courts, some of which hold that the APA allows for
nationwide injunctions for all offending regulations, while other courts do not. See Siddique, supra note
97, at 2100–01 nn.23–28.
101
For example, Judge Leinenweber cautioned that nationwide injunctions should be used rarely,
even though he decided it was proper in the instant case. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C
5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017) (“Nevertheless, issuing a nationwide injunction
should not be a default approach. It is an extraordinary remedy that should be limited by the nature of the
constitutional violation and subject to prudent use by the courts.”). In affirming Judge Leinenweber’s
decision, the Seventh Circuit also stated that nationwide injunctions should be rare. See City of Chicago
v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 290 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Certainly, the ability to impose a nationwide injunction
is a powerful remedy that should be employed with discretion. . . . Courts must be able to . . . engage in
the ‘equitable balancing’ to determine the relief necessary. Rarely, that will include nationwide
injunctions.”); see also Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction,
131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 62 (2017) (conceding the potential harms of nationwide injunctions but
concluding that she is “not ready to say that national injunctions that apply to nonparties are never
appropriate”).
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Second, the complete relief principle is often difficult to apply because
it works both for and against the cause of reducing judicial discretion with
nationwide injunctions, depending on which half of the rule is emphasized. 102
Judges who decide to issue an injunction can emphasize affording “complete
relief” to plaintiffs, while those who decide that a nationwide injunction is
inappropriate can emphasize fashioning remedies to be “no more
burdensome to the defendant than necessary.” 103 Therefore, this principle
does not truly constrain the use of nationwide injunctions.
C. Berger’s Circuit-Border Rule
A third approach to nationwide injunctions created by Getzel Berger
would geographically limit a nationwide injunction to the borders of the
circuit in which the issuing court resides. 104 Berger argues that this approach
is preferable to Professor Bray’s, because even though injunctions
sometimes need to be applied more broadly than against just the named
parties, nationwide injunctions are nevertheless too extreme of a remedy and
should not be used. 105 Berger finds support for his proposal in two places: the
congressional policy choice to divide the circuits into geographic units, and
the policies underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Mendoza that the
federal government is not subject to nonmutual issue preclusion. 106
First, Berger argues that the circuit court system demonstrates
Congress’s intention to balance value for uniformity with percolation, and
that his circuit-border rule respects this policy choice. 107 Second, with respect
to the Court’s holding in Mendoza, Berger argues that, because the Supreme
Court noted the importance of the circuits’ ability to communicate with one
102 See Berger, supra note 62, at 1080 (“Many courts quote Yamasaki to support the issuance of
narrow injunctions, emphasizing the ‘no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary’ part. Other
courts, however, cite the same language in support of broad injunctions by focusing on the ‘complete
relief’ part of the sentence to reason that broad injunctions are permitted if necessary to completely redress
the plaintiff’s grievance.” (footnote omitted)).
103 See id.; Bray, supra note 7, at 444 (“When courts want to grant injunctions that go beyond
protecting the plaintiffs, they point to . . . the need for complete relief. When courts want to grant
injunctions that protect only the plaintiffs, they point to . . . the principle that equitable remedies should
be no more burdensome than necessary.” (footnote omitted)); see also Va. Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v.
FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir. 2001) (“This injunction is broader than necessary to afford full relief to
[the plaintiff].”); Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he
plaintiffs would not receive the complete relief to which they are entitled without statewide application
of the injunction.”); Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying
nationwide injunction and noting that “[a]n injunction ‘should be no more burdensome to the defendant
than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs’” (quoting Califano, 442 U.S. at 702)).
104 See Berger, supra note 62, at 1100–06.
105 See id. at 1100.
106 See id. at 1101; see also United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).
107 See Berger, supra note 62, at 1101.
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another, precedent thus supports the circuit-border rule because the rule
promotes the same value. 108
While Berger’s thesis is an admirable attempt to solve a complex
problem, it has three notable shortcomings. First, his thesis purports to rest
on the implied congressional intent to limit the reach of courts to the borders
of their respective circuits. However, courts of equity have always been able
to enjoin acts committed outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction.109
Indeed, language in Califano specifically denies that equity is limited by
geography. 110 Given the long, unbroken history of equity acting in
personam 111 regardless of geographical lines, Congress would need to be far
more explicit in order to geographically restrict courts’ authority in this way.
Second, while the circuit borders are a useful way of breaking up the
nation for injunctions or other jurisprudential purposes, the choice of where
to draw the circuit lines is a policy choice that has no equitable “pedigree.”
One could arguably use any other formulation of jurisdictional boundaries to
which injunctions apply, such as the borders of the ninety-four district courts.
This division would be no less arbitrary than the current circuit court
divisions and would remain a policy choice made for pragmatic reasons, not
equitable purposes.
Third, in a few rare cases, the circuit-border rule could actually be more
restrictive than Professor Bray’s proposal because some cases necessarily
involve issues that cross circuit lines. For example, environmental litigation
concerning Great Smoky Mountains National Park would, under Berger’s
framework, have to be conducted in two parallel proceedings. The park is
partially in both Tennessee and North Carolina, which are in the Sixth and

108

See id. (“The nature of the regional circuits features prominently in Mendoza, which focused on
the ability of the regional courts of appeals to disagree with each other.”).
109 See Bray, supra note 7, at 422 n.19 (“On the other hand, to protect the plaintiff, equity was willing
to enjoin acts committed outside of the Chancellor’s territorial jurisdiction. . . . Geographical lines are
simply not the stopping point.”).
110 See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“Nor is a nationwide class inconsistent with
principles of equity jurisprudence, since the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the
violation established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class.”). It could be argued, as Berger
does, that the court in Califano was speaking about the propriety of injunctions in class actions, not equity
in general. See Berger, supra note 62, at 1102–03. However, the context of the quote seems to be
“principles of equity jurisprudence” in general, not Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
specifically.
111 The phrase “equity acts in personam” is an ancient maxim of equity, which meant that (among
other things) courts of equity could enforce their judgments in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Horace
Stringfellow, Equity Acts in Personam, 2 ALA. LAW. 230, 230 (1941) (“[Because equity acts in
personam,] courts of equity, having jurisdiction of the parties, are enabled to adjudicate and settle matters
affecting property situated in other States and countries . . . .”).
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Fourth Circuits, respectively. 112 Under Professor Bray’s framework, courts
would be free to issue injunctions that apply across circuit borders so long as
they only apply to named parties and would therefore allow for broader
injunctions in these cases. Requiring parallel federal litigation for a single
issue simply because the problem in question occurs across circuit borders
would be inefficient and is not required by law.
In sum, while legal problems are often limited to small geographic areas
and a court can tailor its injunction to the smallest geographical area possible,
a firm rule against issuing any injunction outside of circuit borders is
inconsistent with fundamental rules of equity and existing jurisprudence and
is ultimately an arbitrary distinction.
D. Walker’s Nine Factors
In his note, Daniel Walker compiled a list of nine factors that he argues
judges should evaluate when considering the proper scope of an injunction:
(1) the type of parties; (2) whether the defendant is a government agency; (3)
whether the challenge is facial or as applied; (4) the nature of the right; (5)
the type of injunction sought (mandatory versus prohibitory and preliminary
versus permanent); (6) the type of agency being enjoined; (7) restriction on
venue statutes; (8) whether a narrower injunction would effectively result in
legislating by the judiciary; and (9) the boundaries of the affected class. 113
While Walker addresses several important factors that courts consider,
all nine factors can be consolidated into three main categories: Walker’s first,
second, sixth, and ninth factors all concern the same basic question: the type
of parties involved in the litigation; factors three and four both concern the
nature of the claim being asserted; and factors seven and eight both concern
judicial economy. This Note ultimately consolidates Walker’s nine elements
into a three-factor test along these same lines. 114 Further, this Note also adds
to the list of factors, 115 and makes a normative argument for why balancing
tests are appropriate in the context of nationwide injunctions. 116

112 See Great Smoky Mountains, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/grsm/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZF9Y-H29V].
113 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1144–51.
114 See infra Section III.A.
115 The factors not present in Walker’s note that are discussed here include: federalism and abstention
issues, the Mendoza precedent, plaintiff-detection issues, the asymmetric effects of res judicata from
multiple litigation, comity and conflicting injunctions, the likelihood of forum shopping, and percolation.
See infra Section III.A.
116 See infra Part V.
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E. Other Approaches
Various scholars have advanced other recommendations for
constraining the nationwide injunction. Professor Michael Morley suggests
that courts apply an equal protection and severability analysis before issuing
a nationwide injunction, thereby requiring plaintiffs who are seeking broad
remedies to seek certification as a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 117 Professor Maureen Carroll recommends a
similar but softer approach: a set of changes to make class action lawsuits
more appealing. 118 Lastly, Professor Michelle Slack argues that courts should
employ a presumption against class action certification where the
government is a party to the lawsuit. 119 While valid, this Note does not
extensively discuss these perspectives because they are ultimately
compatible with this Note’s proposed multifactor balancing test. 120
III. WHO, WHAT, AND WHERE: TRIANGULATING EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Courts of equity possess the power and discretion to apply injunctions
in novel ways to novel problems. This is a feature of, not a “bug” in, the
system of equity. However, the system is not without drawbacks—namely
the indeterminacy and inconsistency inherent in any system of standards and
rules. This Note suggests that the solution to the indeterminacy and
inconsistency of the equitable system is an obvious and time-tested one:
equitable balancing. The concept of “balancing the equities” is hardly new,
and courts already use it to determine when injunctions are proper.121
Moreover, equitable balancing is consistent with equity’s history. 122
Balancing tests are beneficial because they prompt judges to adequately
justify their choice of remedies, an important feature of the common law
system.

117

See Morley, supra note 13, at 549−50.
See Carroll, supra note 50, at 2017, 2074–81 (proposing changes that include expedited timelines,
reforming the “necessity” doctrine, and making class actions more financially attractive to attorneys).
119 See Michelle R. Slack, Separation of Powers and Second Opinions: Protecting the Government’s
Role in Developing the Law by Limiting Nationwide Class Actions Against the Federal Government,
31 REV. LITIG. 943, 987–95 (2012).
120 However, Professor Slack’s idea appears to conflict with Professor Morley’s and Professor
Carroll’s ideas, because a court cannot logically encourage or require plaintiffs to certify as a class while
simultaneously employing a presumption against certifying classes where the government is a defendant.
121 See, e.g., Breswick & Co. v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 912, 915 (1955) (“Where the question is
whether an injunction should be granted the irreparable injury facing the plaintiff must be balanced
against the competing equities before an injunction will issue.”).
122 As discussed above, equity has a long history of providing courts with discretion. See supra notes
83–85 and accompanying text.
118
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Ultimately, it seems inevitable that courts will have a great deal of
discretion when fashioning equitable remedies, because discretion has been
a feature of equity for centuries. Therefore, absent congressional attention,
the best solution is a return to the roots of equity by engaging in a multifactor
balancing test to determine if a nationwide injunction is an appropriate
remedy. 123 A system of multifactor balancing allows for that discretion while
still imposing some necessary limits.
The biggest roadblock to the use of a balancing test in the context of
nationwide injunctions, however, is the sheer number of relevant factors.
Unfortunately, previous scholars have not fully appreciated this problem,
and a thorough examination shows that there are far too many factors to
construct a simple balancing test. This Part proceeds by first examining these
factors and then proposing a more workable three-factor balancing test. This
proposed framework provides a means for evaluating and critiquing different
cases.
A. Relevant Factors
While scholars have attempted to evaluate the factors that courts should
consider when deciding whether to issue a nationwide injunction, 124 any list
will almost certainly be incomplete because it is impossible to consider, ex
ante, every relevant factor. Nevertheless, this Section attempts to collect the
most important factors that courts have, and should, consider when
fashioning an injunctive remedy.
1. Abstention
Under the abstention doctrine of “Our Federalism,” federal courts
should not enjoin an ongoing state prosecution out of concern for states’
interest in enforcing their laws. 125 This theme of deference to state
123 This Note leaves to one side the discussion of whether balancing of the equities or tailoring the
remedy is the more appropriate approach. While there may be some instances where Congress has clearly
stated its intent about the proper scope of a remedy, see supra note 10 (comparing cases discussing
whether the APA requires a nationwide injunction against illegal agency actions with constitutional
remedies and many statutory schemes), Congress is largely silent on the issue of remedies and has not
signaled a movement away from traditional principles of equity. For a comparison of balancing of the
equities with tailoring the remedy, see David Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to
Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 633−36 (1988).
124 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1144–51.
125 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44−45 (1971) (“[Our Federalism] represent[s] . . . a system
in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in
which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, ‘Our Federalism,’ born in the early
struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation’s history and its
future.”).
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institutions is also present in the line of Tenth Amendment anticommandeering cases established by the Rehnquist Court, starting with New
York v. United States 126 and Printz v. United States. 127 There are a number of
other abstention doctrines, including Pullman, 128 Colorado River, 129
Burford, 130 and Rooker–Feldman 131 abstention, which are similar in that they
often consider issues of comity between the courts. However, unlike Tenth
Amendment cases, these doctrines of abstention leave discretion to the judge
applying them. While the details of injunctions will vary from doctrine to
doctrine, the existence of a state as a party, especially as a defendant, may
make the case more analogous to Tenth Amendment cases and, thus, may
counsel toward a narrower injunction or even no injunction at all. 132
2. Intercircuit Nonacquiescence
Following the Court’s holding in United States v. Mendoza, 133 the
presence of an agency as a defendant is a significant factor for judges in
weighing whether to issue a nationwide injunction. As discussed in the
previous Part, a nationwide injunction can effectively subject an agency to
de facto issue preclusion and render intercircuit agency nonacquiescence
moot. 134 If the defendant (against whom an injunction is sought) is an agency,
then this factor counsels toward applying a narrowing presumption to
mitigate issue preclusion and preserve intercircuit nonacquiescence.
3. Type of Agency
The type of agency against which an injunction is sought can also affect
whether a court will defer to that agency when balancing the equities and

126 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (invalidating a portion of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 on the grounds that it violated principles of federalism by unfairly coercing
states into taking title to radioactive waste).
127 521 U.S. 898, 933–35 (1997) (holding that provisions of the Brady Act violated principles of
federalism by compelling state officers to enforce federal law).
128 See R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (holding that federal courts may stay
a claim until a state’s supreme court has a chance to review the constitutionality of the act itself).
129 See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819–20 (1976) (holding
that abstention is appropriate in certain circumstances where there is parallel litigation in the state and
federal courts).
130 See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317–18 (1943) (holding that a federal court may abstain
from deciding complex issues of state law).
131 See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (holding that federal courts are
not to review state court decisions without direction from Congress); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S.
413, 416 (1923) (holding that the federal courts are not, absent direction from Congress, to sit in review
of state court decisions).
132 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1145 (discussing the first factor).
133 464 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1984).
134 See supra Section I.B.
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choose not to issue an injunction in close cases. 135 For instance, courts may
be more likely to defer to law enforcement agencies than to other types of
agencies. 136 As with issues of comity, federalism, and separation of powers,
courts try to avoid unduly hampering law enforcement’s ability to carry out
its legal duties while simultaneously continuing to protect the rights of
persons with whom law enforcement interacts.
4. Substantive Area of Law and Scope of the Injury
One of the most important factors courts consider is the substantive area
of law giving rise to the claim. 137 As noted above, civil rights cases likely
require more complex and systemic remedies than, for example, breach of
contract cases, even those involving the federal government. 138 Likewise, a
First Amendment case may be a candidate for broader injunctions because
the harm experienced through a chilling of speech is diffuse and difficult to
trace entirely to one particular plaintiff or group of plaintiffs.139 Professor
Morley’s recommendation that courts conduct a type of severability analysis
addresses exactly this consideration. 140 Relatedly, some claims by their very
nature require “indivisible relief,” where failing to enjoin related parties
could subject defendants to incompatible standards of conduct. 141 In contrast,
if the harm to particular plaintiffs can be addressed by enjoining enforcement
of only some parts of the statute, then a nationwide injunction overturning
the entire statute is unnecessary. By examining how localized the harm is—
135

See Walker, supra note 94, at 1148.
See id. (“[C]ourts tend to show a high degree of deference to law enforcement agencies, and this
deference seems to influence the courts’ decisions to narrow the scope of injunctions that might otherwise
be acceptable.”). For example, the Supreme Court has approved some restrictions on inmate behavior by
prison administrators, such as limits on contact with the outside world, which would not be permissible
in another context. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (“To ensure that courts
afford appropriate deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to
infringe constitutional rights are judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily
applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.”).
137 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1146 (“The fourth consideration that courts should take into account
is the nature of the right being vindicated.”).
138 See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
139 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1146.
140 See Morley, supra note 13, at 551 (“Generally, a court severs the invalid provision . . . unless: (i)
the remaining sections cannot operate coherently as a law, or (ii) the court concludes that the entity that
enacted the statute or regulation would not have intended for its remaining sections to be enforced without
the invalidated portions.”).
141 Professor Martin Redish and William Katt explore the concept of indivisible relief in the context
of the virtual representation debate. See Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell,
Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1879 (2009) (“The concept of indivisible relief refers to cases in which
the relief sought by multiple parties from the same defendant demands that the defendant take singular
action—in other words, that the defendant cannot, either legally or physically, provide wholly separate,
disjointed, or inconsistent relief to the various plaintiffs.”).
136

355

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

geographical, statutory, or otherwise—courts have an indication of how
broad the injunction may need to be to remedy the violation.
5. Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges
While some courts have arguably gone too far in treating the existence
of a facial challenge as prima facie support for a nationwide injunction, 142 the
nature of the challenge is nonetheless important. An influential opinion in
this regard is Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissent in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 143 in which he stated that as-applied challenges generally justify
narrow remedies, while facial challenges generally justify remedies that
benefit nonparties. 144 While broad remedies are not necessarily mandated in
facial challenges, they are nevertheless an important factor to consider.
6. Type of Injunction
The type of injunction sought can materially affect the scope of that
injunction. For example, mandatory injunctions compel the defendant to act,
while prohibitory injunctions prohibit an action but leave the defendant
otherwise free. 145 The stage of the litigation is also important—for instance,
judges issue temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions before
parties have fully conducted discovery and argued their cases. Because the
claim has not been fully litigated, courts should consider whether they can
narrowly tailor the remedy. 146
7. Judicial Resources and Venue Considerations
The conservation of judicial resources was an important consideration
weighing in favor of an injunction in National Mining Association v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 147 a case involving the propriety of classwide relief in the absence of a class action lawsuit. 148 While the court in
National Mining Association did argue that the APA mandated broad
142 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
13, 2017) (justifying a nationwide injunction because “[t]his case . . . implicates a facial challenge to a
federal statute; the Attorney General’s authority to impose Byrne JAG conditions on the City will not
differ from his authority to do so elsewhere”); see also supra notes 20, 51 and accompanying text.
143 497 U.S. 871, 900 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144 See id. at 913 (stating that “[i]n some cases the ‘agency action’ will consist of a rule of broad
applicability; and if the plaintiff prevails,” the plaintiff “may obtain ‘programmatic’ relief that affects the
rights of parties not before the court.”). The Seventh Circuit also endorsed this dichotomy as a method of
limiting use of nationwide injunctions. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 291 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“A narrow question of law such as is present here is more likely to lend itself to broader injunctive
relief . . . . Accordingly, this does not present the situation in which the courts will benefit from allowing
the issue to percolate through additional courts . . . .”).
145 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1147–48.
146 See id.
147 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
148 Id. at 1409–10.
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injunctions, it also noted its concern that a plaintiff-focused injunction would
merely “generate a flood of duplicative litigation,” costing both the parties
and the courts valuable resources. 149 The fact that the parties conducted much
of this “duplicative litigation” in the D.C. Circuit also factored into the
court’s prediction. 150 The pressures each circuit faces are different, and the
potential for duplicative litigation is unique to each case, so articulating an
abstract principle is difficult; however, the conservation of judicial resources
may sometimes weigh toward issuing a broad injunction.
8.

Affected Class Boundaries and Asymmetric Effects of
Res Judicata
The boundary of potentially affected nonparties influences whether a
broad remedy is appropriate absent a class action suit. There are two main
reasons for this. First, if the affected class of nonparties is very small and
cohesive, an injunction reaching nonparties clearly falls within a court’s
equitable powers because it approximates the English concept of a “bill of
peace.” 151 Even Professor Bray acknowledges that this may be an appropriate
use of the judicial power. 152
Second, allowing for a single class member to win an injunction that
affects a large class puts defendants at a systematic disadvantage. 153 In a class
action, defendants benefit from res judicata against all members of the class
if they win, but face an equally large liability toward each member of the
class if they lose. Hence, with a class action, the risks and rewards are equally
great for both sides. In contrast, if a single plaintiff can win class-wide relief,
the defendant’s liability approximates that of a class action lawsuit. If the
defendant wins, however, the res judicata effect of that decision affects only
one plaintiff, leaving an almost infinite number of other plaintiffs to bring
the same lawsuit. 154

149

See id. at 1409.
See id. (“Moreover, if persons adversely affected by an agency rule can seek review in the district
court for the District of Columbia, as they often may, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), our refusal to sustain a
broad injunction is likely merely to generate a flood of duplicative litigation. Even though our jurisdiction
is not exclusive, an injunction issued here only as to the plaintiff organizations and their members would
cause all others affected by the Tulloch Rule . . . to file separate actions for declaratory relief in this
circuit.” (emphasis omitted)).
151 A bill of peace was a type of “proto-class action” which allowed the chancellor to consolidate a
small, cohesive group of duplicative suits into a single proceeding. See Bray, supra note 7, at 427.
152 See id. at 427 (justifying the use of equity in the nineteenth century to enjoin collection of illegal
municipal taxes on the basis that the relevant classes were small, representing the type of “micropolity”
characteristic of a bill of peace).
153 See Walker, supra note 94, at 1149–51.
154 See id. at 1150.
150
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9. Miscellaneous Factors
In addition to the eight factors discussed above, there are five other
factors that are relevant to determining the proper scope of equitable relief:
uniformity, 155 plaintiff detection, 156 egalitarian concerns, 157 forum
shopping, 158 comity concerns surrounding conflicting injunctions, 159 and
percolation. 160
In sum, no fewer than thirteen factors are relevant when determining
the proper scope of an injunction. This Note proposes consolidating these
factors into three meta-factors that judges can more uniformly and
effectively apply in cases involving nationwide injunctions.
B. Simplifying Balancing Through a “Triangulation” of
Equitable Remedies
This Note’s first contribution is a new framework for categorizing and
evaluating the factors that affect nationwide injunctions. While all thirteen
factors discussed above are deserving of individual consideration, an
analysis of the key characteristics of each factor reveals three overarching
categories of factors: (1) the identity of the parties before the court; (2) the
nature of the claim being litigated; and (3) the effect of the remedy on the
judicial system where the claim is being litigated. These three factors can be
thought of as asking “who,” “what,” and “where,” respectively.
The first category, the “who,” concerns the nature of the parties before
the court. This category includes six subfactors: (a) the type of party involved
(state, federal, and private parties); (b) federalism and abstention issues
associated with state defendants; (c) the precedent of Mendoza and
intercircuit agency nonacquiescence; (d) the type of agency being sued
(including whether it is a law enforcement agency); (e) the presence of a
certified class (or conversely, the size of the nonparty beneficiaries); and (f)
plaintiff-detection issues.
The second category, the “what,” concerns the nature of the claim being
litigated. This category includes three subfactors: (a) the substantive area of
law/scope of the injury; (b) facial versus as-applied challenges; and (c) the
type of injunction sought (mandatory versus prohibitory and preliminary
versus permanent).

155
156
157
158
159
160
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See supra text accompanying notes 90–94.
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See supra Section I.B.
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The third category, the “where,” looks at the court deciding the case and
the effects on the court system as a whole. This category includes six
subfactors: (a) boundaries of the class and asymmetric effects of res judicata;
(b) conservation of judicial resources and venue considerations; (c)
uniformity in application of the law; (d) comity and conflicting injunctions;
(e) forum shopping; and (f) percolation.
This framework demonstrates how certain factors interrelate, and in
doing so, simplifies the inquiry, making a balancing test more manageable.
Not every subfactor will be relevant in each case—for instance, federalism
or abstention issues are only applicable where a state is a party. Each metafactor, however, will always be relevant to the inquiry. The next Part argues
that these three meta-factors can and should be used in a multifactor
balancing test in order to determine whether a nationwide injunction is
appropriate in a given circumstance.
IV. “HOT AND COLD”: EASY AND DIFFICULT CASES FOR EQUITABLE
BALANCING AND A PATH FORWARD
In order to determine when a nationwide injunction is appropriate,
courts should analyze the three meta-factors described in the previous Part
as a multifactor balancing test. This Part first discusses how judges should
apply the balancing test to both easy and hard cases, and then explores how
this balancing test would apply in practice by examining a test case: the
litigation surrounding President Trump’s travel ban.
A. Applying the Balancing Test to “Hot,” “Cold,” and “Warm” Cases
One general objection to use of a balancing test is that it renders district
court opinions effectively unreviewable, because a balancing test leaves too
much discretion in the hands of judges. Professor Bray argues that this is a
fundamental flaw of using a standard rather than a rule. 161 However, this
danger is overstated. At the very least, this Note argues that there are two
categories of “easy” cases, or cases in which the propriety of injunctions that
reach beyond named plaintiffs is clear. Some cases are “hot,” where all three
meta-factors point toward issuing a broad injunction. Other cases are “cold,”
where all three meta-factors point against issuing a broad injunction, and
doing so would be an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The difficult, or
“warm,” cases are those in which the factors are split. 162
161 See Bray, supra note 7, at 480 (“[A] district court selected through forum shopping will apply a
relatively indeterminate standard, which will then be leniently reviewed by a court of appeals . . . .”).
162 It is no answer to say that the factors will always point at least 2–1 in one direction, because each
factor will vary in importance based on the circumstances. For example, in applying a multifactor
balancing test for compulsory joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), courts have come to
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A flexible standard utilizing a multifactor balancing test affords a way
to curb the greatest errors in “hot” and “cold” cases without prohibiting
injunctions from ever reaching nonparties. Even in those “warm” cases,
where the categories are split, applying a balancing test still affords a benefit
over the status quo because it prompts judges to justify their reasoning. At
minimum, this creates an opportunity for increased dialogue among courts
about the proper scope of injunctive relief, which is the ordinary conception
of how the common law works. 163 Legal rules are made to apply to real
circumstances, and by testing out different approaches, courts are able to
develop more nuanced rules that solve difficult cases. Injunctions should be
no exception.
B. Applying the Multifactor Balancing Test
While many nationwide injunctions have been controversial, none
received as much attention as Executive Order 13,769 164 and its successor,
Executive Order 13,780, 165 popularly referred to as the “travel bans” or
“Muslim bans.” 166 This Note applies the three-factor balancing test to the
litigation surrounding President Trump’s travel ban. 167 In doing so, this Note
argues that the travel ban was a “cold” case, in which all three meta-factors
counseled against an injunction.
1. “Who”—the Identity and Nature of the Parties Before the Court
The first category, the identity and nature of the parties before the court,
counsels against issuing a nationwide injunction. The federal government—
more specifically the Department of Homeland Security, the Secretary of
a consensus that one factor—the availability of another forum for the plaintiff to assert their claim—is
more important than the other two. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
163 There are many different justifications and accounts for the common law method. See generally
R. L. Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law Method, 57 B.U. L.
REV. 807 (1977) (discussing the value of justiciability requirements in preserving a common law method
of legal interpretation).
164 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No.
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
165 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No.
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
166 See Melanie Zanona, Timeline: Trump Travel Ban’s Road to the Supreme Court, THE HILL (Sept.
17, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/350932-timeline-trump-travel-bansroad-to-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/HS9Y-M2ZQ].
167 While litigation surrounding the first and second Executive Orders differed with respect to
liability, the two were essentially identical from a remedies perspective and will therefore be analyzed
together. See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017)
(enjoining portions of the travel ban), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017) (issuing a nationwide injunction against the
president’s revised travel ban); Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017) (enjoining other
parts of the revised travel ban).
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State, and the President—was the defendant in this case. 168 The relevant
subfactors here include: the type of agency being sued, the value of
percolation amongst the courts, and the breadth of the affected class. 169 First,
the presumption that broad injunctions against law enforcement agencies
should be avoided counsels against a nationwide injunction. 170 The severe
consequences of enjoining the President are analogous to the dangers of
enjoining a law enforcement agency, because the President must oversee
enforcement of the laws under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.171
Enjoining a president directly is arguably even more dangerous than
enjoining a law enforcement agency—indeed, both the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits, while keeping the rest of the injunctions intact, reversed the district
courts’ injunctions against the President for precisely this reason.172
Moreover, the Department of Homeland Security and State Department (led
by the Secretary of State) are also law enforcement agencies. Therefore, this
subfactor weighs against issuing an injunction.
The last relevant subfactor—the breadth of the affected class 173—also
weighs strongly against issuing an injunction. While it is difficult to say how
many people the first or second travel bans would have affected, the revised
travel ban limited the number of refugees per year to 50,000, half the number
President Obama had planned to admit. 174 Therefore, the number of
unnamed, affected plaintiffs would be in the tens of thousands, which means
that a nationwide injunction affects many more plaintiffs than “bills of
peace” ever did, putting defendants at a systematic disadvantage. 175 Putting
the pieces together, each of these three relevant subfactors counsels against
issuing an injunction, and thus the broader “who” meta-factor ultimately
counsels against issuing a nationwide injunction.
168

See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
Other subfactors in this category include: federalism and abstention issues associated with state
defendants, Mendoza precedent and intercircuit agency nonacquiescence, the presence of a certified class,
and plaintiff-detection issues. See supra Section III.A.
170 See supra Section III.A.3.
171 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”).
172 See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 788 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir. 2017) (“We recognize that ‘in general, this court has no jurisdiction
of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties . . . .’” (quoting Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802–03 (1992))).
173 See supra Section III.A.8.
174 See Alexander Burns, 2 Federal Judges Rule Against Trump’s Latest Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
15,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html
[https://perma.cc/X4VS-CLLA] (“[The travel ban] would have also . . . limited refugee admissions to
50,000 people in the current fiscal year. Mr. Obama had set in motion plans to admit more than twice that
number.”).
175 See supra Section III.A.8.
169
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2. “What”—the Nature of the Claim
While more balanced (or “warmer”), this category also ultimately
counsels against issuing an injunction in this case. Relevant subfactors here
include: the substantive area of law, the fact that the challenge was a facial
challenge, and the type of injunction being sought. First, the substantive area
of law at issue—immigration law—does not have the same spill-over effects
associated with, for example, a free speech claim. The Fourth Circuit argued
that because the challenge involved an Establishment Clause violation,
language in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe 176 indicated that a
broad injunction was justified. 177 This language stated that allowing a
discriminatory policy to be enforced against some, but not all, citizens would
send a message that the plaintiffs were “outsiders” and “not full members of
the political community.” 178
Yet the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on Santa Fe seems misplaced, as the
language cited concerned liability, not the appropriate scope of the remedy.
More importantly, in the travel ban cases, it is possible to distinguish
between the injury felt by each individual plaintiff seeking entry to the
United States, because one plaintiff could be let in while another is not. In
contrast, the issue of allowing prayer in school (the issue in question in Santa
Fe) is an example of “indivisible relief” 179 as prayer would either be allowed
or not allowed at football games. The nature of the claim at issue in Santa Fe
therefore had to be litigated all at once to avoid conflicting judgments.
Because the travel ban cases did not involve indivisible relief, this subfactor
counsels against issuing an injunction. The fact that the challenge is a facial
challenge, however, cuts in the other direction. The type of injunction sought
is also prohibitory (not allowing Executive Order 13,780 to take effect),
which is less onerous than a mandatory injunction.
On balance, this meta-factor counsels against issuing an injunction,
because if the mere fact that a challenge is facial and prohibitorywhich
characterizes many constitutional suits against enforcing a lawwere
sufficient to justify an injunction, then injunctions would nearly always
issue. The type of injury involved in suits challenging enforcement of a law
is therefore a subfactor that should be accorded less weight than the other
“what” subfactors. With respect to the “what” factor, then, the injury

176 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) (holding that policy of allowing students to initiate prayer at football
games violated the First Amendment).
177 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 605.
178 See id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 309 (considering
whether student-led prayer at football games was constitutional)).
179 For a discussion of indivisible relief, see supra Section III.A.4.
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involved in the travel ban does not justify a broad injunction because it is not
associated with the type of inseverable harm present in other areas of the law.
3. “Where”—the Effect on the Court System
The third and final category likewise counsels against a nationwide
injunction in this context. Relevant subfactors here include: the boundaries
of the affected class and the asymmetric effects of res judicata; conservation
of judicial resources and venue considerations; uniformity in application of
the law; forum shopping; and percolation. 180
First, the boundaries of the class size were very large, so the asymmetric
effects of res judicata against the government were correspondingly large.
Only one affected immigrant had to prevail for every class member to
benefit, while the government had to win every case. Next, regarding judicial
resources and venue considerations, there does not appear to be a court
crowding issue like in National Mining Association, 181 because none of the
travel ban cases had to be filed in a specific circuit. Third, forum shopping
was also certainly a potential problem in this case, because those opposing
the Executive Order could focus their efforts on cases in ideologically
friendly districts. 182 Fourth, the preliminary injunction also prevented
percolation among the courts as it always does, 183 and this effect was
pronounced because the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on a similar legal
issue. 184 While most of the subfactors weigh against a nationwide injunction,
uniformity in application of the law counsels toward broad relief, which both
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits specifically mention as a justification for their
decision. 185 Lastly, efficiency also counsels toward issuing an injunction, as
it always does, because it prevents duplicate litigation.
Ultimately, the direction in which this third meta-factor ought to lean
depends on the weight a judge puts on each of these subfactors. As discussed
above, the only subfactors that counsel toward a nationwide injunction are
180 Another subfactor in this category not discussed is the risk of conflicting injunctions. See supra
Section I.B.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 147–50.
182 President Trump even took to Twitter to specifically decry “judge shopping” after the Ninth
Circuit’s decision. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 26, 2017, 3:38 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/857182179469774848 [https://perma.cc/EP57-XKJA].
183 For a discussion of the importance of percolation, see supra Section I.B.
184 However, concerns over shortcutting the “percolation” process were somewhat ameliorated given
that a district and circuit court had already reviewed Executive Order 13,769, see Washington v. Trump,
847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 3, 2017), and two district courts and two courts of appeals had reviewed revised Executive Order
13,780, see Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,
857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md.
2017); Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017).
185 See Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 787–88; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 605.
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uniformity and efficiency. However, those factors always counsel toward
disposing of an issue once and for all, and as Professor Bray eloquently
argues, Congress’s choice to break up the courts into circuits was itself a
policy decision that sacrificed uniformity and efficiency in favor of more
incremental, stable change. 186 When uniformity and efficiency are the only
reasons to issue a broad injunction, a narrower injunction should issue,
because otherwise nationwide injunctions will always be issued, frustrating
Congress’s policy decision and violating comity amongst the courts.
Therefore, this third meta-factor ultimately counsels against issuing an
injunction in the travel ban cases.
In sum, the application of this Note’s three-factor balancing test finds
that a nationwide injunction was not proper in the travel ban cases because
all three meta-factors point against broad relief, and the only two subfactors
weighing toward a nationwide injunction—uniformity and efficiency—
always counsel toward broad relief. This case therefore presents one of the
clearest possible examples of where an injunction should not issue.
V. WHY A BALANCING TEST WILL BE WORKABLE IN PRACTICE
While the three-factor balancing test discussed above may sometimes
allow courts of appeals to conclude the district courts abused their discretion
in issuing a nationwide injunction, there are at least two counterarguments
to the use of multifactor balancing tests: First, balancing tests are unworkable
in practice and fail to give parties adequate notice as to what the law is; and
second, they violate separation of powers by reevaluating policy choices
made by Congress (or by “the people” in the case of constitutional claims).
In analyzing these counterarguments, this Part concludes that over time, the
common law method will cause courts to come to a greater consensus as to
which factors are most important, just as they have with the necessary parties
doctrine. Next, this Part argues that even if one concedes the objection to the
use of balancing tests for determining liability, balancing tests are proper for
determining remedies.
A. The Necessary Parties Balancing Test and the Common Law Method
Many scholars and judges have decried balancing tests as unworkable
and as undermining the rule of law. Notably, Justice Scalia often opposed
balancing tests in the law, because he viewed “The Rule of Law as a Law of

186 See Bray, supra note 7, at 481–82. As Professor Bray argued, “[e]ach legal system can pick its
poison, tending toward the vices of immediate, final resolution or the vices of slow, provisional
resolution.” Id. at 482.
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Rules” 187 and not of standards. 188 This core objection to the use of balancing
tests is that, because they afford judges substantial discretion, the tests are
unworkable, and their results are simply a function of a judge’s intuitions
and personal policy preferences. Those who defend a balancing test tend to
argue that a rule may prove undesirable in some instances,189 and the
common law method will adequately allow judges to eventually reach a
workable rule. This is an empirical question that demands specific examples
to see if balancing tests are successful in practice, a question that is outside
the scope of this Note. Balancing tests are used in a variety of contexts,
including the Fourth Amendment, 190 procedural due process, 191 “dormant”
Commerce Clause cases, 192 the First Amendment, 193 and the decision to issue
a permanent injunction. 194 To illustrate, consider one example of a balancing
test in further detail: the compulsory joinder of parties under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 19(b). 195

187

See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
For a discussion on the difference between rules and standards, see generally Pierre Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379 (1985).
189 See id. (discussing a dispute between Justice Benjamin Cardozo and Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes in which Justice Holmes endorses a rule while Justice Cardozo endorses a standard).
190 See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118 (1986) (reasonableness of a search); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983) (definition of a search).
191 See Scalia, supra note 187, at 1182 (“[A]t the point where an appellate judge says that the
remaining issue must be decided . . . by a balancing of all the factors involved, he begins to resemble a
finder of fact more than a determiner of law.”); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in
the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 965–66 (1987) (listing areas where the Supreme Court uses
balancing tests).
192 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits.”).
193 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380–81 (1984) (“Making that judgment
requires a critical examination of the interests of the public and broadcasters in light of the particular
circumstances of each case.”). Balancing tests are perhaps most controversial with respect to the First
Amendment and have a long history of use in that context. See Aleinikoff, supra note 191, at 966–68
(summarizing the history of balancing tests in the First Amendment context); see also Martin H. Redish,
Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger,
70 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1186–87 (1982) (endorsing a balancing test for the First Amendment, stating
that “[b]ecause . . . an inflexible test cannot allow a court to fit its rule to the unique circumstances of a
case, it is likely to become a procrustean bed that will often prove to be either overprotective or
underprotective in individual instances”).
194 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (adopting a four-factor test
for issuing a permanent injunction).
195 Rule 19(a) describes “required” parties who must be joined if feasible, while Rule 19(b) lays out
four factors that courts must balance to determine if the claim should be permitted to proceed without a
Rule 19(a) party. FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
188
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Compulsory joinder began as an equitable doctrine created to address
the inefficiency of multiple litigation.196 There is substantial similarity
between the balancing test courts use to determine whether someone is a
necessary party under Rule 19 and the balancing test this Note endorses. 197
Both tests focus on the parties to the case, the nature of their claims (under
the Rule 19 test, the prejudicial effect of a judgment given the type of rights
that are affected), and concerns for judicial economy. Given time, there is
reason to believe that the common law method will work as well for
injunctions as it has for compulsory joinder, provided that judges explain
their reasoning as balancing tests require. 198
As is true with equitable doctrines in general, the rule against
proceeding without interested parties is not an inflexible rule but is one that
gives courts discretion to apply the law sensitively to the facts of each case.199
After the influential case Shields v. Barrow, 200 the doctrine became mired in
the sometimes-hazy distinction between “common” and “joint” rights, which
Professors Charles Wright and Mary Kane decried as a “jurisprudence of
labels.” 201 Congress rejected Shields’s formalistic approach and instead
adopted a four-factor test. 202 The four factors the Court now applies to
determine if joinder of parties is “indispensable” are: (1) the plaintiff’s
interest in having a forum, (2) the defendant’s interest, (3) the interest of the
196 See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 120 (1968) (discussing
how compulsory joinder was created in equity to address “the inefficiency of litigation involving only
some of the interested persons”).
197 The similarity is closest with the three-factor test recommended by Professor John Reed, whose
1957 law review article was influential in the 1966 amendment to Rule 19. See John W. Reed,
Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 330 (1957) (laying out his test
that balances: (1) the interest of the present defendant, (2) the interest of the absent plaintiff(s) or
defendant(s), and (3) the courts’ interest in the efficient resolution of litigation).
198 See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
199 See Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 166–67 (1825) (“This equitable rule, however,
is framed by the Court itself, and is subject to its discretion. It is not . . . an inflexible rule . . . but, being
introduced by the Court itself, for the purposes of justice, is susceptible of modification for the promotion
of those purposes.”).
200 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854).
201 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 70, at 498 (6th ed.
2002).
202 As it was passed in 1966, Rule 19 stated, in relevant part:

The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the
person’s absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which,
by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice
can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (1966) (amended 2007). For reasons not important here, the factors laid out by the
Court in Provident Tradesmens differ somewhat from the factors listed in Rule 19.

366

113:331 (2018)

Who, What, and Where

absent party, and (4) the interest of the courts and the public in the complete
and efficient resolution of litigation. 203 As with any balancing test, the Court
noted that conflict between the factors will often occur. 204
In applying this test, courts have frequently found that in a given case
all relevant factors point toward 205 or against 206 dismissing for nonjoinder of
an indispensable party. These are analogous to the “hot” and “cold” cases
previously discussed in this Note. In the close, or “warm,” cases where a
conflict in the factors exists, some courts have proceeded despite prejudice
to the absent party in so proceeding, 207 while others have dismissed despite
some factors counseling toward allowing the claim to proceed. 208 But while
Provident Tradesmens remains the only major Supreme Court case
interpreting Rule 19(b), lower courts have come to a consensus on the
primary importance of the plaintiff’s interest in having a forum, allowing
cases where a plaintiff would have no other forum to proceed despite the
other three factors pointing toward dismissal. 209 Therefore, while not perfect,
Rule 19(b)’s multifactor balancing test appears to be a functioning and
generally coherent body of law that has “worked itself pure” 210 since 1966.
Over time, provided that courts fully explain their choice of remedy, they
should come to a consensus as to which factors matter most.

203 Provident Tradesmens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109–12 (1968). This fourfactor test was influenced by Professor Reed’s three-factor test. See supra note 197.
204 See Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 118–19 (“The decision whether to dismiss (i.e., the
decision whether the person missing is ‘indispensable’) must be based on factors varying with the
different cases, some such factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves,
and some subject to balancing against opposing interests.” (second emphasis added)).
205 See, e.g., B. Fernández & Hnos., Inc. v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 516 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[A]ll
four 19(b) factors still militate in favor of finding Kellogg Caribbean indispensable . . . .”).
206 See, e.g., Trans Energy, Inc. v. EQT Prod. Co., 743 F.3d 895, 902 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e are
satisfied that there is no reason to believe that any party will be harmed by REV’s absence, or that the
plaintiffs received an improper ‘tactical advantage’ by including REV as a party.”).
207 See Bennie v. Pastor, 393 F.2d 1, 3–4 (10th Cir. 1968) (allowing case to proceed despite the fact
that the absence of the defendant’s daughter could prejudice the defendant by subjecting her to multiple
liability, because other factors counseled against a finding of indispensability).
208 See generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Rule
19(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as Amended in 1966, Providing for Determination to be Made
by Court to Proceed With or Dismiss Action When Joinder of Person Needed for Just Adjudication is Not
Feasible, 21 A.L.R. Fed. 12, § 8 (1974) (citing McKenna v. Udall, 418 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1969), as an
example of a case dismissing for nonjoinder despite the fact that some factors counseled toward allowing
the case to proceed).
209 See generally Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure
Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (1985) (“Though this is but one factor in a multifactor
balancing test, federal courts have elevated it to primary importance by their reluctance to dismiss in the
absence of an adequate alternative forum.” (footnote omitted)).
210 Omychund v. Barker (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch.) (“[T]he common law . . . works itself pure
by rules drawn from the fountain of justice.”).
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B. The Rules vs. Standards Debate in the Equity Context
The second major objection to balancing tests is that they effectively
allow the judiciary to eliminate an individual’s rights—be they
constitutional, common law, or statutory in nature—in the name of
“balancing.” Justice Hugo Black was most closely aligned with this
argument. He objected to the emerging use of balancing tests for
constitutional rights because “the Framers themselves did this balancing
when they wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.” 211 To balance
interests in determining the scope of a constitutional right, therefore, was to
usurp the Article V amendment process and second-guess the democratic
will of those who ratified the constitutional provision in question.
Even for an absolutist like Justice Black, the use of balancing tests is
less problematic when used to determine remedies than when used to
determine rights (or violations). Indeed, even Justice Black used the
balancing of the equities test for equitable remedies.212 Equitable balancing
in the remedies context does not change the contours of a constitutional right.
Balancing tests, like the one this Note endorses, would not allow a judge to
enjoin a policy for purely utilitarian reasons but would instead first require a
finding of unconstitutionality. Balancing tests in the remedies context are not
triggered unless a determination has been made that a violation,
constitutional or otherwise, has taken place, in which case the court can
decide how it should use its equitable powers. Therefore, one may concede
the general truth of the objection to balancing tests while still adopting the
test this Note recommends. 213
CONCLUSION
The use of the nationwide injunction has gained substantial notoriety,
and cases like President Trump’s travel ban will continue to present
themselves. In an effort to protect similarly situated nonparties from harm,
courts have sometimes gone too far by issuing nationwide injunctions in
situations that do not warrant such an extreme remedy. While the courts have
always had substantial discretion in fashioning equitable relief, the

211

Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 879 (1960).
See, e.g., Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 165 (1946) (Justice
Black, writing for the Court, endorsing a balance of the equities test between creditors and debtors in a
bankruptcy proceeding); United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940)
(opinion of Justice Black holding that balancing of equities did not apply, but implicitly assuming its legal
validity elsewhere).
213 Balancing tests in matters of procedure, like in Rule 19(b) for compulsory joinder of parties, may
also be less troubling from this perspective because they only affect how and where rights are adjudicated,
not the substance of the rights themselves.
212
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widespread use of broad injunctions can cause great harm to the federal
government and the judicial system as a whole. A complete elimination of
this remedy is likewise problematic because it is inconsistent with the history
of equity and runs counter to precedent.
Hope for the future lies in a return to the past, namely the time-tested
method of equitable balancing. While there are dozens of potentially relevant
factors in this balancing, all of them boil down to three metafactors: the type
of parties before the court, the nature of the claim involved, and the effect
the remedy would have on the court system as a whole. If all three of these
factors point against issuing an injunction, it is abuse of discretion for a court
to do so. Even in the difficult cases where the factors are split, the common
law method will facilitate invention of more nuanced standards and rules,
provided that judges explain their reasoning. While the system of remedies
may seem to be in chaos right now, equity has always innovated to
compensate for new problems. A three-factor balancing test will help to
accomplish that goal.
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